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When China signed a Protocol of Accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001, other country members were allowed to consider China as a Non-Market Economy until the end of 2016. Taking into account this restraint, the aim of this paper is to answer the following question: can the Market Economy Status Recognition (MES) be measured by a de-facto compliance? The variable used to measure the compliance is the number of antidumping investigations initiated by each country. Hence, the countries which recognize China as a market economy would have a fewer antidumping investigations than the countries that are still treating Beijing as a Non Market Economy, which is the key reason of why the Chinese Government has been campaigning vigorously since 2001 to gain a MES status by a larger number of its economic partners.

El Protocolo de adhesión de China a la Organización Mundial del Comercio, firmado en Diciembre de 2001, permitió a otros países miembros considerar a China como un país sin economía de mercado (NME, por sus siglas en inglés) hasta finales del 2016. Este trabajo pretende responder a la pregunta: ¿Se puede medir el estatuto de economía del mercado (MES, por sus siglas en inglés) según su cumplimiento? La variable utilizada para medir el cumplimiento fue el número de investigaciones de antidumping iniciadas por país. Se espera que los países que reconocen a China el estatuto de economía del mercado, MES, realicen menos investigaciones antidumping que los que todavía consideran que ésta no tiene economía de mercado (NME). Esto explicaría por qué desde el 2001 el gobierno chino ha estado haciendo una enérgica campaña para ganar la condición de MES entre sus socios económicos. ; When China signed a Protocol of Accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001, other country members were allowed to consider China as a Non-Market Economy until the end of 2016. Taking into account this restraint, the aim of this paper is to answer the following question: can the Market Economy Status Recognition (MES) be measured by a de-facto compliance? The variable used to measure the compliance is the number of antidumping investigations initiated by each country. Hence, the countries which recognize China as a market economy would have a fewer antidumping investigations than the countries that are still treating Beijing as a Non Market Economy, which is the key reason of why the Chinese Government has been campaigning vigorously since 2001 to gain a MES status by a larger number of its economic partners.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Preface -- Who will find this book useful? -- About the book -- What to expect from the book -- Book structure -- Prerequisites -- How to use the textbook in a methods course? -- Contributors -- Part I: Introduction to R -- 1. Basic R -- 1.1 Installation -- 1.2 Console -- 1.3 Script -- 1.4 Objects (and functions) -- 2. Data Management -- 2.1 Introduction to data management -- 2.2 Describing a dataset -- 2.3 Basic operations -- 2.4 Chain commands -- 2.5 Recode values -- 3. Data Visualization -- 3.1 Why visualize my data? -- 3.2 First steps -- 3.3 Applied example: Local elections and data visualization -- 3.4 To continue learning -- 4. Data Loading -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Different dataset formats -- 4.3 Files separated by delimiters (.csv and .tsv) -- 4.4 Large tabular datasets -- Part II: Models -- 5. Linear Models -- 5.1 OLS in R -- 5.2 Bivariate model: simple linear regression -- 5.3 Multivariate model: multiple regression -- 5.4 Model adjustment -- 5.5 Inference in multiple linear models -- 5.6 Testing OLS assumptions -- 6. Case Selection Based on Regressions -- 6.1 Which case study should I select for qualitative research? -- 6.2 The importance of combining methods -- 7. Panel Data -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Describing your panel dataset -- 7.3 Modelling group-level variation -- 7.4 Fixed vs. random effects -- 7.5 Testing for unit roots -- 7.6 Robust and panel-corrected standard errors -- 8. Logistic Models -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Use of logistic models -- 8.3 How are probabilities estimated? -- 8.4 Model estimation -- 8.5 Creating tables -- 8.6 Visual representation of results -- 8.7 Measures to evaluate the fit of the models -- 9. Survival Models -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 How do we interpret hazard rates? -- 9.3 Cox's model of proportional hazards.

This study investigates a novel dataset comprised of a universe of 537 donations in 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, between 11 February and 20 June 2020, which provides a high level of detail on China's and Taiwan's mask diplomacy. We describe who the main donors were, who the main recipients were, what was donated to each country, and which variables explain why some countries received more aid than others. Drawing on previous literature, the article advances understanding about the political determinants of these donations. Our findings revealed that, although seemingly uncoordinated, donations made by China's central government, Chinese companies, cities, and foundations were strongly affected by two political determinants, namely the recipient's partnership status with China and the One China Policy. Furthermore, aid provided by China's Central Government was larger in autocracies than in democracies. (JCCA/GIGA)

This study investigates a novel dataset comprised of a universe of 537 donations in 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, between 11 February and 20 June 2020, which provides a high level of detail on China's and Taiwan's mask diplomacy. We describe who the main donors were, who the main recipients were, what was donated to each country, and which variables explain why some countries received more aid than others. Drawing on previous literature, the article advances understanding about the political determinants of these donations. Our findings revealed that, although seemingly uncoordinated, donations made by China's central government, Chinese companies, cities, and foundations were strongly affected by two political determinants, namely the recipient's partnership status with China and the One China Policy. Furthermore, aid provided by China's Central Government was larger in autocracies than in democracies.

Why do some states choose to recognize de facto states, even when this involves potential costs? We explore this question through the case of Paraguay–Taiwan relations, arguing that Paraguay uses its diplomatic recognition policy for status seeking, which generates intangible and material benefits that offset the macroeconomic opportunity costs of foregone Chinese investment, aid and credit. We build an econometric model to estimate Paraguay's "Taiwan cost" and then develop a qualitative case study that draws on semi-structured interviews with actors in Paraguayan foreign policymaking to explain the domestic dynamics that underpin the relationship. We advance recent work on small states' pursuit of international status by illustrating how small and de facto states follow different status-seeking rationales than those commonly recognized in the literature. We also build on that literature by exploring how elite structures shape status seeking. Though unusual, the case of Paraguay–Taiwan relations has broader implications for bilateral relationships with de facto states and status-seeking strategies of small states.

This paper examines whether localized trade shocks from China influence Brazilians' views on integration with the country. We test the following hypotheses: (1) as trade shocks are localized, views on trade should form at the local, rather than at the individual level, and (2) as localized trade shocks affect both workers and companies in a same region, they should also influence legislators' views on China. Our analyses find support for both claims, but only among losers from Chinese trade. Residents and legislators from localities hurt by import shocks tend to hold negative views about economic ties with China, whereas neither residents nor legislators from localities benefitted by export shocks exhibit more positive views about the country. Our paper contributes to the literature on the politics of trade by incorporating meso-level theories of trade preference formation and by establishing the conditions under which the interests of constituencies should shape legislators' views on international trade.

AbstractWhy do some states choose to recognize de facto states, even when this involves potential costs? We explore this question through the case of Paraguay–Taiwan relations, arguing that Paraguay uses its diplomatic recognition policy for status seeking, which generates intangible and material benefits that offset the macroeconomic opportunity costs of foregone Chinese investment, aid and credit. We build an econometric model to estimate Paraguay's "Taiwan cost" and then develop a qualitative case study that draws on semi-structured interviews with actors in Paraguayan foreign policymaking to explain the domestic dynamics that underpin the relationship. We advance recent work on small states' pursuit of international status by illustrating how small and de facto states follow different status-seeking rationales than those commonly recognized in the literature. We also build on that literature by exploring how elite structures shape status seeking. Though unusual, the case of Paraguay–Taiwan relations has broader implications for bilateral relationships with de facto states and status-seeking strategies of small states.

Abstract
This study examines why a large number of Western advanced economies joined the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 despite the bank's purported challenge to the Western-centred international order in the area of multilateral development finance. Through a mixed-method examination involving elite interviews, analyses of government pronouncements and regressions, and by drawing on concepts from rational choice theory, international policy diffusion, and rational design of international institutions, this study finds that the AIIB's success with regard to its large membership is due to China's effective creation of a demand for the organization among Western advanced economies. We argue that policymakers in Western countries enjoyed 'induced agency', which China granted them in the process of creating the organization and deciding about its membership. First, Western advanced economies had agency because their involvement was needed to prevent the AIIB from becoming a homogenous small organization consisting of Asian debtor countries in favour of a global organization with a heterogeneous group of both debtor and creditor country members. The AIIB was thus set up to accommodate the specific economic and political goals of Western advanced economies. Secondly, Western advanced economies experienced agency in the process of deciding about their membership in the bank because China proactively courted them to join the AIIB. China moreover endorsed the spontaneous intensification of communications that ensued among Western advanced economies with regard to joining the AIIB. Both efforts ultimately resulted in diffusion among them of the decision to become members. Thirdly, the Western advanced economies were granted agency in the process of determining the AIIB's organizational design, thus allowing them to converge the initially diverse visions for the institutional design of the bank and shift it from contesting the existing system of multilateral development banks to effectively integrating into it. Our study thus advances a theory of country-specific demand for membership in an international organization.

This study examines why a large number of Western advanced economies joined the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 despite the bank's purported challenge to the Western-centred international order in the area of multilateral development finance. Through a mixed-method examination involving elite interviews, analyses of government pronouncements and regressions, and by drawing on concepts from rational choice theory, international policy diffusion, and rational design of international institutions, this study finds that the AIIB's success with regard to its large membership is due to China's effective creation of a demand for the organization among Western advanced economies. We argue that policymakers in Western countries enjoyed 'induced agency', which China granted them in the process of creating the organization and deciding about its membership. First, Western advanced economies had agency because their involvement was needed to prevent the AIIB from becoming a homogenous small organization consisting of Asian debtor countries in favour of a global organization with a heterogeneous group of both debtor and creditor country members. The AIIB was thus set up to accommodate the specific economic and political goals of Western advanced economies. Secondly, Western advanced economies experienced agency in the process of deciding about their membership in the bank because China proactively courted them to join the AIIB. China moreover endorsed the spontaneous intensification of communications that ensued among Western advanced economies with regard to joining the AIIB. Both efforts ultimately resulted in diffusion among them of the decision to become members. Thirdly, the Western advanced economies were granted agency in the process of determining the AIIB's organizational design, thus allowing them to converge the initially diverse visions for the institutional design of the bank and shift it from contesting the existing system of multilateral development banks to effectively integrating into it. Our study thus advances a theory of country-specific demand for membership in an international organization.